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Poor Arguments for the Rich?
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Abstract
This paper discusses the philosophical view proposed by Gregory Mankiw in his recent article “Defending the One Percent” (JEP 27-3, 2013): the just deserts view in application to income distribution. Mankiw’s view suffers from three unsolved problems: the Criteria Problem, the Measurement 
Problem, and the Problem of the Missing Desert Function. The overall conclusion 
is that Mankiw’s normative “Defense of the One Percent” fails quite drastically.
I . In “Defending the One Percent” Gregory Mankiw makes a couple of 
remarkable claims about income inequality in US society since the 1970s (similar 
claims will apply to similar societies):
“These high earners have made significant economic contributions, but they 
have also reaped large gains.” (22)
“Rather, it seems that changes in technology have allowed a small number of 
highly educated and exceptionally talented individuals to command superstar 
incomes in ways that were not possible a generation ago.” (23)
“It makes sense that a nation would allocate many of its most talented and thus 
highly compensated individuals to this activity…the vast personal reward may 
well exceed the social value of what is produced.” (24)
“…and their greater intelligence will be reflected, on average, in higher incomes.” (25)
“…most of the very wealthy get that way by making substantial economic 
contributions…” (30)
“In light of these facts, the most natural explanation of high CEO pay is that the 
value of a good CEO is extraordinarily high…” (31).1
Political Philosophy
Peter Baumann is a Professor of Philosophy at Swarthmore College. He studied mainly 
 at Göttingen (Germany). He received both his PhD and the venia legendi at the Uni- 
versity of Göttingen. His interests are both in theoretical philosophy (mainly epist- 
emology) and practical philosophy (mainly theory of practical rationality). He likes to 
leave the philosophical armchair from time to time and get inspiration and information 
from cognitive science (especially cognitive psychology) and from the social sciences. 
HRP Vol 21.indd   106 12/1/14   8:56 AM
The Harvard Review of Philosophy 
Defending the One Percent? 107
vol.XXI 2014
Different types of claims are being made here:
(a) Mere correlation claims: High incomes are highly positively correlated 
with significant contributions to society or with high talent and intelligence;
(b) Causal-explanatory claims: Significant contributions (or high talent and 
intelligence) bring about high incomes.
Apart from these descriptive claims Mankiw also has in mind a
(c) Normative-justificatory claim: Significant contributions justify high 
incomes (for the contributors).
Defending (c), Mankiw proposes a “‘just deserts’ perspective” (32). 
One might suspect that claims (a) and (b) are also normative insofar as 
the notion of significance is a normative one. However, even if that is the case, the 
normativity of the notion of significance does not seem essential to claims (a) and 
(b). One can reformulate such claims without loss of substance by talking about 
contributions the author finds significant. This makes the descriptive nature of 
these claims even more obvious.
One question one should then raise is whether (a) and (b) are true. Mankiw 
does not offer much evidence for the correlation claims here apart from some brief 
references. The causal claims require more than evidence for correlations and are 
also in need of more support. One major problem might be the operationalization of 
the notion of “significant contributions.” As long as it is unclear how to accomplish 
that, empirical testing of claims (a) and (b) seems out of reach.
II . However, I don’t want to pursue these points (or any of the economic points 
Mankiw is making in his paper) any further here. Rather, I would like to set them 
aside and focus on the justificatory claim (c) and the openly philosophical side of 
Mankiw’s paper. What exactly is the normative idea in (c)? According to desert 
theories of justice (see Sadurski 1985, ch.5, Miller 1999a, 1999b) everyone should 
get what they deserve: “suum cuique” as Ulpian and others had it. Applied to 
income distribution, the view says that everyone should have the income they 
deserve. Which factors are relevant to and determine desert is controversial 
amongst defenders of desert views: Is it the effort that counts or rather the 
outcome of the effort or a mix of both? It seems Mankiw favors an outcome or 
performance-based view of desert. Let us go with that and not bother with the 
reasons why this version of the view is preferable to the others. 
A performance-based just deserts view of monetary income can be 
formulated thus (following up on Mankiw’s brief remark (32) that “people should 
receive compensation congruent with their contributions”): 
(JDI) For any amount A of monetary income: Receiving A is deserved if and 
only if A is the right compensation for the significance of the contribution 
the earner has made.
(JDI) is still quite rough. Perhaps it does not hold for some amounts of income and 
needs to be restricted in its domain. Perhaps a bi-conditional is too strong and needs 
to be replaced by a simple conditional. However, we can put these worries about 
potential complications aside here because they won’t affect the main points here. 
III. In order to give (JDI) some substantial content, one needs to answer 
several questions. First of all: What are the normative criteria of significance 
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and why should one accept them? Suppose a group of CEOs is very successful 
in proposing, marketing and selling a new product. Additional jobs are being 
created, but the new production line also creates bad environmental side effects. 
What is the normative significance of the CEO’s performance? One would have 
to weigh the positive effect on the job market against the negative effects on 
the environment. This requires a broad and deep normative view about what 
is important in life and about relative degrees of importance. Such views are 
typically quite controversial within societies, and it is not clear at all how such 
controversies can be resolved. Can philosophy help? Certainly economics can’t. 
Even if measurement in utilities (monetary or not) was feasible, this would not 
help with the normative question of which utility function is the normatively 
adequate one. Unfortunately but also unsurprisingly, there is no help on this to 
be found at all in Mankiw’s paper. Call this first major problem with Mankiw’s 
view on just deserts the “Criteria Problem.”
IV. Second, as no economist should be surprised to hear, there is a 
“Measurement Problem.” (JDI) does not merely say that the person who 
made some contribution should get some compensation. The amount of the 
compensation has to correspond in some precise way to the degree of significance 
of the contribution for which the person is compensated. So significance of 
contribution comes in degrees, and we have to be able to measure those degrees. 
This is a huge problem even if we put aside the Criteria Problem. Mankiw says 
nothing on this issue in his paper. The problem is not to assign precise values 
to degrees of significance (say, real numbers between 0 and 1). We can live with 
vaguely demarcated intervals. Even then, it is hard to see how anyone could 
measure such degrees of significance.
V. Third, even if we put both the Criteria Problem and the Measurement 
Problem aside, we still have one “killer” problem left: How to justify the claim 
that certain amounts of money constitute the right compensation for certain 
kinds of contributions (characterized in degrees of significance)? Sure, if degree 
of significance can be measured in monetary terms, then this task is not so 
difficult: Just make the amounts equal. But who would think that one can measure 
normative significance in monetary terms (see above)? One thus still has to come 
up with and argue for a function from degrees of significance to amounts of 
income. Call this the “Problem of the Missing Desert Function.” It seems to be 
a fact of human psychology that those who receive high incomes are typically 
inclined to think that they deserve at least those incomes if not even higher ones. 
However, the question why certain amounts are justifiable remains wide open 
and has certainly not been answered. Mankiw’s remark that “…the vast personal 
reward may well exceed the social value of what is produced” (24) suggests 
that the value of the income should be equal to the value of the outcome of the 
performance of the earner (assuming the latter is not measurable in monetary 
terms). The person should get a reward for her contribution, and the value of 
the latter should be equal to the value of the former. The idea of a fair exchange 
of commodities might have its intuitive appeal, but it remains radically unclear 
what equality of some monetary value with some non-monetary value could even 
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mean. And the project of measuring normative value (ethical value, for instance) 
in monetary terms seems hopeless. Hence, Mankiw’s just deserts view stands and 
falls with a solution to the Problem of the Missing Desert Function. 
In a recent article for the New York Times, a former hedge-fund trader 
writes: “In my last year on Wall Street my bonus was $3.6 million—and I was 
angry because it wasn’t big enough” (Polk 2014, 1). Is he right? Would he have 
deserved more? What would Mankiw say? And what about the bottom one 
percent—do they deserve even less? Or do they also deserve a hefty bonus? And 
what kinds of social reform would this require? What would Mankiw say? Given 
the theoretical resources Mankiw is offering (if any), there is simply nothing he 
can say in response to such questions. There is no principle in sight which we 
could use in order to solve the problem of the Missing Desert Function. 
VI. Mankiw does not solve any of the three major problems for his view: 
neither the Criteria Problem nor the Measurement Problem nor the Problem of 
the Missing Desert Function. He does not even discuss these or similar problems. 
Why, then, should anyone be rationally convinced by what he is saying? Apart 
from these problems, it is also a wide open question why one should favor a (any) 
desert view of justice in the first place. John Rawls (see 1971, sec. 48) has famously 
rejected desert views with an interesting though, admittedly, controversial 
objection. Here is a version of it. Suppose we are discussing the claim that someone 
S deserves something D for some outcome O brought about by S’s act P. P has a 
“basis” in abilities and resources which enable S to bring about O. Call this the 
“desert basis.” Typically, the desert basis is not itself deserved by S. The additional 
assumption that (for any S, D, O, P)
S deserves D for O as brought about by P only if P’s desert basis is itself deserved
plus the assumption that
P’s desert basis is not itself deserved
entails the conclusion that
S does not deserve D for O as brought by P.
This is a general claim concerning many types of desert claims.2 Whatever one 
thinks about desert views of justice at the end of the day, objections like the above 
need to be addressed. One final worry deserves to be mentioned briefly, at least: 
There will also be questions about the possibility or scope of individual desert in a 
world of social cooperation. Didn’t Caesar have at least a cook with him when he 
beat the Gauls?3 Does it make any sense to try to separate individual contributions 
to essentially social activities? If yes, how can it be done? 
VII. How good a view is also depends on how bad the alternatives are. Mankiw 
briefly discusses utilitarian (see, e.g., Smart 1978, Sadurski 1985, 267–275, Schmidtz 
2006, 140–149) views (27–29) and, admittedly, makes a few fine points against 
the basic utilitarian idea (without going into the details of different versions of 
utilitarianism). Egalitarian (see, e.g., Dworkin 1981a, 1981b, Sen 1992) views are 
the main target here, but they are not explained and discussed to any sufficient 
degree of sophistication; what Mankiw is dealing with is rather a very primitive 
version of egalitarianism few egalitarians would take seriously.4 And what 
about need-based views (see Sadurski 1985, ch.6, Miller 1976, ch.4, 1999c)? Are 
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they disqualified from the beginning? Mankiw very briefly touches on Rawls’ 
theory of justice,5 which has been the most influential view on justice in recent 
times. Interestingly, Mankiw does not even mention Nozick even though he 
uses a variation of Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain-example (21; see Nozick 
1974, 161–164). Nozick is not a desert but an entitlement theorist. Would a view 
which justifies claims to property on the basis of the “justice of acquisition” of 
the piece of property be an alternative for Mankiw’s attempt of defending the one 
percent? Perhaps not: not if many or most of the relevant claims to entitlement 
have a history involving some relevant force and fraud in the past (see as a vivid 
illustration of the problem Tucker 1996, 391–393).
But perhaps I’ve attributed too much theory here to Mankiw? Perhaps he 
does not really have a desert theory in the more precise sense in mind. Perhaps 
he just wants to say that people should get what they deserve where “what they 
deserve” is to be explained as “what they should get”? Hopefully, that is not his 
position because it would lack content. It is more charitable to attribute a desert 
view in the more specific sense to him. However, without any progress towards 
the solution of the triad of problems mentioned above (Criteria, Measurement, 
Desert Function) Mankiw’s view still lacks a lot of content and argumentative 
support. What we have so far isn’t much more than the bare normative claim that 
the one percent more or less deserve what they are getting. 
VIII. One final consideration that speaks against that claim even if one works 
with a desert view. Compare nurses with the top one percent. The average 
annual wage of registered nurses in the US in 2009 was $66,530 (see: http://
www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/Policy-Advocacy/Positions-and-
Resolutions/Issue-Briefs/RN-Employment-Earnings.pdf). Does the significance of 
the work of a nurse really amount to only a fraction (say, a bit more than 1/20) of 
the significance of the contribution of the typical member (like the former hedge-
fund trader quoted above) of the top 1-percentile ($1,219,700 in 2009; see 30)? 
Or consider inequality at a global level. According to a recent Oxfam 
briefing paper, “[a]lmost half of the world’s wealth is now owned by just one 
percent of the population” (Oxfam 2014, 2). Also, “[t]he wealth of the one percent 
richest people in the world amounts to $110 trillion. That’s 65 times the total wealth 
of the bottom half of the world’s population” (Oxfam 2014, 2). The paper adds 
that “[t] he bottom half of the world’s population owns the same as the richest 
85 people in the world” (Oxfam 2014, 2).6 Would Mankiw or anyone be ready to 
defend these 85? What if this number went down to 50? Or to 2? Defending the 
Two? Defending the One?
Again, I’m not discussing the economics of inequality of wealth and 
income but rather a certain widespread normative view used to justify such 
inequalities. Even if a desert account can be made to work and the three main 
problems mentioned above can be resolved, it hardly seems plausible that it 
would allow for a defense of the one percent as they are now in the US and other 
countries. One the other hand, if such a desert account cannot be made to work, 
then we should look for better alternatives to Mankiw’s proposal. One way or 
the other, Mankiw’s case is threatened by immediate collapse.
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IX. Mankiw does not seem to worry much at all about any of the points made 
here or about the type of problems any just deserts view brings with it. His 
paper ends with a section entitled “The Need for an Alternative Philosophical 
Framework.” Not much is offered on that account here. To be sure, Mankiw admits 
from the start that he will be playing “the role of amateur political philosopher” 
(22). But still, even from an amateur one would—and could—expect more. What is 
needed are detailed and careful normative arguments rather than mere assertions 
of some political view. 
Notes
1 There is no reason to worry that these quotes might be taken out of context; the context in 
which they are made in Mankiw’s paper is irrelevant to my focus here.
2 To guard against a possible misunderstanding: This does not mean that one would be 
justified in not giving D to S for P or in taking D away from S. It just means that desert does 
not constitute an entitlement to D. There is all the difference in the world between saying “You 
should not have this” and “That’s not a reason why you should have this.”
3 “Cäsar schlug die Gallier. / Hatte er nicht wenigstens einen Koch bei sich?” (Brecht 1981, 656)
4 The scenario of “perfect economic equality” with which the article opens is a bit of a 
caricature of more serious egalitarian views. The whole article seems to focus exclusively on this 
rather extreme idea of perfect income equality. However, a crucial question for any egalitarian 
is, as Amartya Sen has forcefully proposed to anyone partial to the relevant debates, “Equality 
of What?” (see Sen 1982) Marx’ famous objection against egalitarian income distribution (see 
Marx 1962) might have been motivated by similar considerations.
5 —again, not without seriously misconstruing the view under attack: Mankiw’s kidney 
analogy and the conclusion that Rawlsian principles would justify “government-mandated 
kidney donation” (32) ignores the role of the first principle of justice in Rawls’ theory. See Rawls 
1971, passim.
6 For these data, Oxfam refers to the Global Wealth Report 2013 by Credit Suisse.
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